A complete FM26 recreation of Luis de la Fuente’s Spain, including roles, instructions and the tactical ideas behind their triumph.
For the second time in the nation’s history, Spain are world champions!
In a feisty affair in the city that never sleeps, it was the Spaniards who would end up dancing the night away after a dramatic Ferran Torres finish, in extra time, enthroned a truly dominant performance with its crowning glory: the elusive FIFA World Cup trophy.
Across the 120-or-so minutes, Spain held their nerve and remained entirely composed, no matter how instigative their Argentine opponents were, and they quickly assumed control of the match.
Argentina’s first shot in the entire match came in only the 114th minute, showcasing quite how dominant the world champions-elect were throughout the contest.
Spain were the best team across the whole tournament and are truly worthy of their crown. Congratulations to them!
Daedal Double-Width
An intriguing aspect of Luis de la Fuente’s side across this World Cup campaign has been his side’s use of ‘double-width’.
‘Double-width’ is essentially as it says on the tin: two players remain wide on the flank, rather than one remaining wide and the other inverting as a result.
Spain use double-width to drag across and separate the opposition’s defensive and midfield lines. An example of this can be seen below:
As the blue rectangle showcases, both Pedro Porro and Lamine Yamal are staying wider and holding the width for the side on the right side.
With Dani Olmo roaming in central areas, the right half-space is situationally left vacated [pink rectangle].
This exact situation occurred often during the World Cup, with Lamine Yamal and Pedro Porro working in tandem to find intuitive ways to consistently access this space indirectly.
At times, this would be through Porro passing the ball to Yamal before making a penetrative, underlapping run into this space.
Alternatively, Porro could receive the ball and carry forward, giving Yamal time to make a darting run into this pocket.
Another perk of using double-width is that it opens up the midfield more, creating space for Spain’s maestro midfield trident, along with the floating Oyarzabal up front, to dictate play in the middle of the pitch.
Spain averaged ~64% possession per game at the World Cup, and this was a significant factor as to why.
Fabulously Fluid Rotations
A staple of Spain’s simply sumptuous possession-based game across this World Cup was their ability to create space and exploit it, with the previous point a great example of that.
A significant factor behind their creation and exploitation of space was the sheer positional fluidity of their players, who were given licence to situationally drift from their respective positions to create ‘tensions’ in the opposition’s defensive structure.
The term ‘tensions’ was coined by the fantastic Jon MacKenzie of The Athletic.
This most often occurred in midfield, where their midfield three - along with Oyarzabal up front - worked in tandem to create space in the opposition’s structure for others to exploit.
The aforementioned double-width was crucial in allowing this to occur.
However, whilst the midfield three were very fluid and flexible positionally, they always retained the same principle throughout: all three midfielders playing on different ‘lines’.
This creates depth in Spain’s structure, giving players a passing option backwards, sideways, and ahead of them: multidirectional football.
The Key to Their Formidable Defence
Across their World Cup-winning campaign, Spain conceded just one goal: a testament to their impeccable defensive strategy and the individuals who worked as a collective to consistently shut out even the most prolific of strike forces.
Like most top teams, Spain’s defensive approach started from the front, as they would press high in a 4-4-2 formation.
From opposition goal kicks, however, this 4-4-2 formation could be blurred as Spain would often go man-to-man across the frontline and midfield, with Fabian usually stepping up to mark the opposition’s deepest midfielder.
An example of this can be seen below:
The pink lines indicate which Spanish player will mark which opposition player.
Often, Laporte wouldn’t actually step up to mark the opposition’s right-sided midfielder, as Spain would look to prevent the ball from reaching him by forcing the opposition’s deepest players into going long and, thus, relinquishing possession.
If the opposition manages to progress beyond the build-up phase, Spain will drop into the aforementioned 4-4-2 and will look to close down their opposition quite often, trying to tempt the opposition into making a mistake or going back.
This strategy paid dividends for the Spaniards, as they consistently forced opposition teams deeper and, across the tournament, were never really under any threat at all.
Let’s Break Down the Tactic
In Possession
In build-up, Spain would look to draw the opposition higher by rotating possession with a multitude of slow, short passes.
As the opposition would come onto them, Spain would insist on playing through their opponents, with a continued insistence on short passes.
As they would progress up the pitch, Spain would look to use space created in central areas to their advantage by playing through the midfield often, before finding underlapping runs from both full-backs, particularly against inferior opponents like Cape Verde or Saudi Arabia.
I chose the ‘Pass to Feet’ instruction as I felt it produced the most optimal results in-game recreation-wise.
In the final third, Spain’s patient, calculated approach continued as they would patiently work the ball into the box.
In general, Spain’s game at this World Cup largely revolved around slow, short passes to retain possession and exploit forthcoming gaps in the opposition’s defensive structure.
To create such gaps, players were given licence to roam and express themselves.
Out of Possession
Without the ball, Spain looked to press the opposition high in an aggressive, man-to-man approach.
To supplement their high press, the defensive line would compact the space in midfield by holding a higher line.
Finally, upon losing the ball, Spain would immediately counter-press to try and regain possession of the ball.
Player Roles
Goalkeeper | Sweeper Keeper
Whilst Unai Simon would act primarily as a ‘Ball-Playing Goalkeeper’, he would actually tend to remain deep as a backwards passing option and would only advance should he have the ball at his feet (‘Dribble More’).
Without the ball, Simon was incredibly active in sweeping loose balls in behind the Spanish defensive line.
Full-Back | Full-Back
Porro’s role, in this system, was very flexible.
Initially, he would remain deeper and narrower to support the team’s build-up through the thirds.
However, if the ball would be played to Lamine Yamal, Porro would then provide penetrative, underlapping runs into the right half-space.
With the ball at his feet, Porro’s game was rather simple: distribute the ball short and take very few touches, retaining the current pace of the game.
(DCR) Ball-Playing Centre-Back | Centre-Back
Both centre-backs, in this system, would initially spread wider to create space for Rodri to drop into, creating a situational back-three base and allowing for easier circulation of the ball.
When on the ball, both centre-backs would often break the lines with penetrative, progressive passes.
However, Pau Cubarsí would usually remain reserved with his passes, typically passing short.
Without the ball, both centre-backs were very reserved and would pick and choose the absolute correct moments to tackle.
When they did tackle, they were very robust in doing so.
(DCL) Ball-Playing Centre-Back | Centre-Back
Cubarsí's partner, on the other hand, was a lot more adventurous with his choice of pass and would also tend to carry the ball forward as a means of deep progression.
Wing-Back | Full-Back
In this particular system, Cucurella performed a similar role to that of Pedro Porro.
However, he would largely perform his actions higher up the pitch.
Additionally, Cucurella would tend to burst all the way to the byline in order to cut the ball across goal.
Without the ball, Cucurella was the more inclined of the two full-backs to step up and mark or close down his man.
I added the ‘Take Fewer Risks’ instruction as I felt he was giving the ball away too often in testing.
Defensive Midfielder | Defensive Midfielder
Rodri’s role, in this system, was relatively simple and straightforward: reliably receive, retain, and recycle possession with nearby team-mates.
Without the ball, both he and Fabian would mark their opponents very tightly.
Central Midfielder | Pressing Defensive Midfielder
Fabian’s role in this system, on the other hand, was a lot more complex.
He would tend to drift wide towards the left side, particularly if the ball was on Spain’s left flank.
However, he wasn’t tied to these movements as, like Olmo in the ‘10’, he could drift from his position to pick up the most optimal positions situationally.
Furthermore, Fabian had the scope to make runs beyond the midfield line, particularly in moments where Oyarzabal, the striker, had dropped off to receive.
Without the ball, Fabian was typically the midfielder to push up and mark the opposition’s deepest midfielder.
Free Role | Centre Forward
Olmo’s role, in this system, epitomised the ‘Free Role’ in FM26.
He would initially position himself between the lines of the opposition’s defence and, from here, he would drift from side to side to create situational overloads and triangles to allow Spain to reliably retain possession.
However, he also had the flexibility to make runs beyond the midfield line - like the aforementioned Fabian - to penetrate space in behind.
Finally, upon receiving the ball, Olmo would tend to carry the ball forward to drive Spain’s attacks forward.
(AMR) Winger | Winger
Both wingers, in this particular system, would hold the width.
However, both wingers were given licence to roam from their respective positions, and this would create tensions in the opposition’s defensive structure.
Lamine Yamal, unlike Baena on the opposite flank, had a large propensity to try and create for himself and his team-mates.
This would come in the form of taking pot shots himself or using his creative wizardry to create for his team-mates.
Finally, I added the ‘Hold Up Ball’ instruction to both wingers’ roles as I felt they were both giving away the ball far too much in testing.
(AML) Winger | Winger
On the other flank, Alex Baena wasn’t as prolific in creating for himself and his team-mates.
However, he was a lot more functional and added a different dynamic to the side, such as the tendency to make runs in behind the opposition’s defence.
Additionally, upon receiving the ball, Baena is a bit more one-directional as he’ll usually cut inside with the ball.
False Nine | Centre Forward
In this system, Oyarzabal will typically stay higher initially before dropping into midfield to supplement the side’s possession game in central areas and to offer a progressive passing option.
Results
FIFA World Cup 2026: Winners
Conclusion
Spain are the champions of the world, both by title and by nature.
Following in the footsteps of the 2008-2012 golden generation of Spanish football, this current bunch under Luis de la Fuente have already completed two thirds of the terrific trifecta.
There will be no surprises if they complete the treble again at Wembley in 2028. Congratulations, Spain!
If you want a taste of this beautiful tactic, make sure to download the tactic using the link attached to this article.
You can also see how Spain performed in our complete FM26 World Cup 2026 simulation.
Make sure to follow FM Blog (@fmbIog) and myself (@AshtonGgmu) on our respective socials.
I hope you have enjoyed this article, and I wish you much success with this tactic on your saves! Thanks for reading!
