Recreating De Zerbi's revolutionary Brighton system — the 4-2-3-1 tactic that rewrote the rulebook.
When Graham Potter was snatched out of Brighton's hands by Chelsea early into the 2022/23 season, few could've predicted that they were on the cusp of something even better! Something extraordinary. Something exciting. Something fresh and new...! Roberto De Zerbi arrived, and his first game as the Seagulls' boss would send shockwaves around the Premier League, as he went toe-to-toe with legendary manager Jürgen Klopp at Anfield, with his Brighton side drawing 3-3 in a stunning state of affairs.
Just a few months later, and De Zerbi and his men were playing Klopp's Liverpool off the park in a comprehensive 3-0 win — a scoreline, of which, that was incredibly flattering to the visitors. De Zerbi's impact was immediate and enthralling, as he guided Brighton to a 6th-placed finish, and a European tour for the following season! Here's how he achieved such mastery...
- Baiting the press ✅
— 🅰️ (@AshtonGgmu) February 23, 2026
- 4-2-4 build-up shape ✅
- Direct ball to dropping striker ✅
- Go back to GK -> Drawing the opp. high ✅
- Direct ball to dropping 10 ✅
- Narrow, one-touch football ✅
- Up, back, and through to penetrate space in-behind ✅
🇮🇹 De Zerbi-ball in #FM26 😍 pic.twitter.com/PzEBEwhYAZ
Leading a Tactical Revolution
Before the Italian tactician arrived in England, teams' build-up strategies were very familiar and distinctive. So, when De Zerbi and his fascinating new build-up strategies started bearing fruit, the world quickly took notice — yet, despite this, no manager could find a way to stop his Brighton team from progressing through the build-up phase.
De Zerbi's build-up strategy revolved around a 4-2-3-1/4-2-4 shape, with the players within the 4-2 base dropping as deep as possible to draw the opposition's midfield higher. In co-ordination, Brighton's wingers would hold a very high starting position in build-up, creating a sizable gap in midfield for Brighton's no.10 and striker to reside within or drop into, as showcased below:
The positioning of the Brighton no.10 and striker would pose the difficult question to the opposition centre-backs: Do they step up to mark them, whilst in turn leaving space in-behind for March/Mitoma to attack? Or do they stay in-line with their full-backs, whilst in turn relinquishing control and initiative to Brighton, who can then find the spare man/men between the lines? Either way, the opposition were damned.
Killing the Press
Brighton had very interesting (and revolutionary!) techniques to find the spare men in-behind, too. With the ball at their feet, Brighton's centre-backs and goalkeeper would just... stand still?! There was, indeed, method in the madness: this still movement would entice the opposition into pressing high — this was how De Zerbi's side would kill their opponent.
As one opposition player would press, they would vacate their marker (let's say Caicedo). Brighton, then, would use multi-pass sequences to find that unmarked player/spare man:
Here is an example: As Sánchez receives the ball from Dunk, the opposition's left-sided striker begins to close down the Brighton 'keeper with a curved run (purple line) to, in theory, eliminate Dunk from Brighton's build-up, forcing the Seagulls down the left.
As the opposition's left-sided striker approaches Sánchez, Dunk moves wider (yellow line) to widen the gap between himself and the opposition's left-sided striker. Groß, at the same time, drops deeper to receive from Sánchez (cyan line), despite being under pressure.
Now, being unmarked, Dunk can receive the ball with ease and Brighton can begin to progress.
Let's Break Down the Tactic
In Possession
In build-up, De Zerbi's Brighton were very patient, as they would slow down to try and entice the opposition to press them higher. In alignment with this idea, the 'keeper would wait a longer time before releasing the ball — of which, he'd predominantly release it shorter and to the centre-backs.
Upon progressing from the build-up phase, Brighton would constantly look to attack the space in-behind, particularly after generating artificial transitions through methodical, short build-up routines. Additionally, Brighton would centralise their possession in an attempt to pierce right through the heart of the opposition.
In the final third, Brighton were patient in their attempts to break down the opposition, and would even go backwards to the 'keeper if the opposition's block was too compact and stubborn — this would draw the opposition higher, again creating space for Brighton to attack into.
In general, Brighton would look to control games through using, almost exclusively, shorter passes. The side would naturally converge into central areas, creating ideal conditions for their shorter passing game to work its magic and for players to combine with one another. Finally, upon regaining possession, Brighton's players would assess the game's situation before deciding whether to counter or retain possession.
Out of Possession
When they didn't have the ball, Brighton were very active in pressing the opposition, as their players would engage in closing down the opposition constantly — from here, the aim was to either force the opposition into going long or trapping them in wide areas, wherefrom Brighton would have the advantage.
To supplement this constant high-press, the side's defensive line were instructed to hold a higher line — although, the line wasn't too high to the point where it was risky. Finally, upon losing possession, De Zerbi instructed his side to counter-press immediately in an attempt to regain possession as soon as possible.
Opposition Instructions
Player Roles
Ball-Playing Goalkeeper | Sweeper Keeper
In this system, the 'keeper was absolutely imperative for the side both in and out of possession. In build-up, the 'keeper played an active role in receiving the ball, standing with it, and recycling possession with short passes. On the other hand, when Brighton didn't have the ball, the 'keeper was very active in sweeping loose balls in-behind the Seagulls' defence and claiming crosses into the penalty area.
Inside Wing-Back | Full-Back
The right-back, in this system, would initially hold a wider position in build-up, before inverting into midfield as Brighton progressed higher up the pitch. However, particularly in the final third, the right-back would drift wider and even make runs in-behind from the right half-space. Finally, with the ball at his feet, the right-back was relatively safe in possession — however, he would go direct into the striker/no.10's feet at times.
Ball-Playing Centre-Back | Stopping Centre-Back
The right-sided centre-back's impact on his team was different to that of his centre-back partner, either Dunk or Colwill. Whilst the right-sided centre-back (usually Webster) wouldn't pass as often as the left-sided centre-back, he would carry forward more often — although, he wouldn't do this regularly.
Additionally, when he would pass, Webster was very strong at breaking the lines to find the striker/no.10. When Brighton didn't have the ball, the right-sided centre-back was the more likely to step up and mark/close down the opposition attacker ahead of him, supplementing Brighton's aggressive high-press.
Centre-Back | Centre-Back
On the other side of defence, Dunk played a slightly different role to that of his centre-back partner. Dunk would pass more often, although this was usually with safer passes to the left-back or 'keeper — however, he would go direct into the striker/no.10's feet often and could even go beyond and find Mitoma/March running in-behind.
Wing-Back | Full-Back
Estupiñán was a great piece of business by Brighton, replacing the departing Cucurella and playing a vital role in 22/23 for the Seagulls. From this position at left-back, Estupiñán would initially hold a wider position, before drifting narrower to help form Brighton's 2-3-5 in-possession shape. From here, with the ball at his feet, he could maraud forward on the carry, cutting inside with the ball to associate with the central players, or even reach the byline to supply a cut-back.
Box-to-Box Playmaker | Pressing Defensive Midfielder
In build-up, the right-sided defensive midfielder (usually Groß) would remain deeper and, at times, dictate the side's play, moving side-to-side across the pitch to aid and support his team-mates. However, as Brighton progressed higher up the pitch, Groß would move higher and would position himself in the right half-space — a key position in Brighton's 2-3-5 set-up.
From here, he would regularly make runs in-behind and crash the box late. Finally, when Brighton didn't have the ball, Groß would move higher to mark an opposition deep midfielder and/or close down the opposition early in their build-up endeavours.
Defensive Midfielder | Defensive Midfielder
Moises Caicedo was fantastic in 22/23, constantly breaking up opposition attacks and was pretty much flawless in build-up — this earned him a £115m move to Chelsea in the summer of 2023! In this system, Caicedo's role was pretty simple: Receive and recycle possession to promote strong ball retention and break up opposition attacks.
Attacking Midfielder | Centre Forward
From this position, Mac Allister was in the best form of his career. Initially, he'd position himself between the lines, before drifting into, and occupying, the left half-space to form Brighton's 2-3-5 in-possession shape. Upon receiving the ball, he would initially hold up play before using a short pass to link play or even find one of March or Mitoma running in-behind.
Wide Forward | Wide Midfielder
In 2022/23, Solly March was almost unplayable at times, scoring a number of important goals for Brighton in their pursuit of European football. In this system, he would primarily stay wider to stretch and pin the opposition's defence — from this higher and wider position, he would make curved, inverted runs in-behind the opposition defence.
Inside Forward | Wide Midfielder
Whilst Mitoma's role was quite similar to March's — particularly in the sense of positioning himself in a higher and wider position — there were a few discrepancies. Whilst Mitoma would initially hold the width, he could drift inside/closer to goal at times to optimise his attacking threat.
Also, upon receiving the ball, Mitoma showed a lot more creativity and autonomy in his attacking endeavours, as he would constantly take on his man with mazy dribbles — he could cut inside before cutting back outside and reaching the byline, adding a layer of unpredictability to his game.
Deep-Lying Forward | Centre Forward
In this system, the striker was asked to constantly drop off the frontline, invading the space between the lines and offering himself as an advanced passing option. Upon receiving the ball, he would primarily focus on laying off the ball to a deeper midfielder or just holding up play — however, he could, at times, show a level of inventiveness in finding March in-behind with a cheeky flick.
Results
Premier League
In testing with Brighton, we ended up winning the Premier League in a fairytale campaign, as we amassed 94 points — 14 points clear of 2nd place Arsenal. Of our 38 league games, we won 29 games, drew 7 games, and lost just 2 games all season.
Across our 38 league games, we scored 92 goals (2.42 goals per game) and conceded just 23 goals (0.6 goals per game) — the league's best record for each.
Domestic Cups
We won our first piece of silverware for the season in March, winning the Carabao Cup after a frantic tussle against Man City, of which we won 3-2! On our way to Wembley, we beat the likes of Arsenal (2-4 AGG) and Aston Villa (1-0).
We were unable to make it a stunning treble-winning season, however, as City got revenge at Wembley in the FA Cup Final, beating us 2-1 in extra time. On our way to the Final, we overcame the likes of Newcastle (1-3), Nottingham Forest (4-0), and a few lower league sides.
Read Also
- FM26 Tactics Hub
- FM26 Best Youth Academies
- FM26 Wonderkids by PA, Price & Position
- FM26 Transfer Budgets
Conclusion
Roberto De Zerbi revolutionised the English game within just six months after his arrival at Brighton, as his unique style of play and intriguing build-up strategies were a true spectacle that no-one could wrap their heads around. His influence on the tactical landscape of the sport will never be forgotten, and he will go down in history as one of football's great innovators.
If you want a taste of this beautiful tactic, make sure to download the tactic using the link attached to this article and make sure to follow FM Blog (@fmbIog) and myself (@AshtonGgmu) on our respective socials. I hope you have enjoyed this article, and I wish you much success with this tactic on your saves! Thanks for reading!
