Real Madrid’s Champions League THREEPEAT – 2016; 2017; 2018 | FM26 Tactical
Recreation
Real Madrid are the undisputed kings of Europe.
With 15 UEFA Champions League titles to boot, the history and heritage in their long-winded love affair with the competition is never-ending - however, it’ll likely never be as fruitful for them as it was between 2016-2018, as Los Blancos won it not once, not twice, but thrice… in a row!
It was, by far, the greatest period in the club’s recent history.
Let’s get into what made Real Madrid so entirely dominant in this period…
2015/16 & 2016/17:
Real Madrid’s European dominance, in this period, came off the back of a flexible 4-3-3 formation used in the 2015/16 and 2016/17 campaigns.
The idea within this shape was to maximise their best players - namely Cristiano Ronaldo - and provide their elite squad with sufficient conditions to dominate games both in, and out of, possession.
Zidane’s Real Madrid side, during these years, did not particularly have co-ordinated, pre-defined patterns of play like a lot of sides have nowadays, as Zidane wanted his squad to create chances from anywhere on the pitch, at any time.
Despite this prerogative, there were a few consistent movements and patterns that would repeatedly occur:
- One, or both, of the full-backs would advance higher and wider, offering the team width and allowing the wingers, Ronaldo and Bale, to move inside.
- The team would often stretch very wide to threaten the opposition with attacking potency across the pitch.
- Wide overloads could, and usually would, be created by Benzema dropping deeper and wider, particularly on the left-side.
When Real Madrid would lose the ball, their comprehensive pitch coverage would provide ideal conditions to immediately try and regain possession through an aggressive, robust counter-press.
If they were unable to win back possession, they would drop into a 4-5-1 mid-block shape - however, as Ronaldo would tend to stay higher, this would actually look like a lop-sided 4-4-2 structure.
2017/18:
Unfortunately, injuries would plague Gareth Bale throughout his time in Madrid, and Real Madrid, combined with manager Zinedine Zidane, had to devise a plan to make up for his continued absence.
In wake of this, Zidane introduced Isco into the fold, switching the side’s formation from the successful 4-3-3 to the 4-4-2 diamond.
This shape lent Real Madrid a lot more dominance in central areas; however, in turn, weakened their influence in the wider areas.
As a result of this, Zidane allowed both of his full-backs to progress very high and wide, whilst Casemiro, at the base of the diamond midfield, would drop between the two centre-backs, providing much-needed defensive cover.
Additionally, this switch in formation led to Ronaldo playing, almost exclusively so, in a much more central region, optimising his ability to impact games and the team.
Behind him, Kroos, Modrić, and Isco would dominate opposition teams with ease, as their excellent technical quality overwhelmed opponents.
It would be Gareth Bale, however, to get the last laugh, as he scored two crucial goals in the UEFA Champions League Final to defeat a defiant Liverpool outfit 3-1 - the first of his goals an absolute peach of a bicycle kick.
Let’s Break Down the Tactic - 4-3-3
In Possession:
When Real Madrid had the ball, they would generally operate at a relatively high tempo, using shorter passes as a platform to dominate games.
They would stretch the pitch very wide, in order to threaten the opposition with constant, potent attacking threat.
From build-up, Navas would tend to distribute short to Varane or Ramos, Real Madrid’s centre-backs - from here, the side would work the ball from out of defence and try to build an attack.
Real Madrid were incredibly fluid, flexible, and, thus, unpredictable in-possession, as they could attack teams in a multitude of ways.
Finally, when they would regain possession, they would almost always try and release Ronaldo on the counter-attack, with Bale and Benzema busting a gut to arrive later as secondary and tertiary attacking options.
Out of Possession:
As aforementioned, when Real Madrid would lose the ball, they would immediately spring into an aggressive counter-press to try and regain possession.
If they were unsuccessful in their attempts, they would drop into a compact 4-5-1/4-4-2 mid-block, wherefrom they would regularly try to force the opposition into making mistakes.
From this mid-block structure, Real Madrid would force the opposition into wider areas as often as possible, wherefrom they would invite crosses into the penalty area, trusting that Varane and Ramos would be able to clear their lines and dominate the penalty area.
Player Roles
Goalkeeper | Goalkeeper:
In this system, Navas’ role was pretty streamlined: Release the ball shorter to the centre-backs and focus on saving shots.
Wing-Back | Full-Back:
Carvajal, like Marcelo on the other side, would tend to move higher and wider; from here, both full-backs would regularly carry the ball forward to aid deep progression. However, Carvajal was the more reserved of the two full-backs in this system, allowing Marcelo to progress higher as much as possible to support Ronaldo.
Centre-Back | Centre-Back:
Whilst both Varane and Ramos were good on the ball, the latter was certainly the superior ball-player. Therefore, Varane would be a bit more reserved in his passing ventures, usually circulating possession confidently and carefully, allowing Ramos to showcase his incredible ball-playing qualities.
Ball-Playing Centre-Back | Centre-Back:
The choosing of this role was a formality, considering the previously explained tendencies and qualities of the two players.
Advanced Wing-Back | Full-Back:
Marcelo did everything that Carvajal would, however, from a higher initial position and on a more regular and consistent basis.
Defensive Midfielder | Screening Defensive Midfielder:
Casemiro was often the trigger for opposition teams’ respective high-presses. However, despite this, the Brazilian ball-winner would still drop deep and consistently provide a shorter passing option - if he did receive the ball, he would usually stick to shorter distribution. When Real Madrid didn’t have the ball, Casemiro would primarily focus on screening the defence, allowing Kroos and Modrić to be more tenacious and intentional in their ventures to regain possession.
Box-to-Box Playmaker | Central Midfielder:
Due to Casemiro’s comparative lack of consistent technical quality, both Kroos and Modrić would take it in turns to drop deeper alongside him to receive, recycle, and/or progress play - the latter would do this more often, whilst Kroos would move wider, allowing Marcelo to position himself even higher up the pitch.
When he would receive the ball, Modrić would often carry the ball out of pressure, bypassing two or three opposition players before feeding an attacker with a ball in-behind.
Alternatively, if Real Madrid had dragged the opposition wide enough to one flank, he could quickly switch the point of the attack and release Marcelo and Ronaldo on the left-side.
Wide Central Midfielder | Central Midfielder:
On the other side of central midfield, Kroos, as just mentioned, would tend to move wider to allow Marcelo to progress further - this would also occur when Kroos would drop deeper, as he would usually drop to the left-side of the two centre-backs to receive the ball in a clear, wide pocket.
From here, like his central midfield partner, Kroos would regularly switch the play to the opposite side.
Inside Winger | Wide Midfielder:
Bale’s role, in this system, was rather complex. Initially, his positioning was wider, before situationally moving inside - wherefrom, he would reside near the centre of the pitch more often. When he would receive the ball, he would regularly take on his man, looking to cut inside before shooting.
Inside Forward | Inside Outlet Winger:
Ronaldo was the crown jewel of this side, as one of the greatest of all time should be.
As Marcelo, behind him, would progressively move higher and wider, Ronaldo would move inside, much closer to Benzema.
From here, with the ball at his feet, the world was his oyster - he could cut inside with the ball and line-up a ferocious shot or create for an attacking teammate.
Deep-Lying Forward | Centre Forward:
In this system, Benzema would often roam from his position and drop deeper to create situational overloads in wide areas. From here, he’d look to link play with shorter passes and create for the attackers around him.
Let’s Break Down the Tactic - 4-4-2 Diamond
In Possession:
Not too much changed for Real Madrid and their in-possession intentions in 2018, despite the difference in formation.
They still operated at a higher tempo, primarily using shorter passes to try and control games.
However, a slight difference in intentions is definitely visible in that Real Madrid, in this system, would focus a lot more of their play down the left-side, with players coming close together to form wide overloads.
Out of Possession:
When Real Madrid didn’t have the ball for sustained periods this year, they would actually drop into more of a 4-3-3 mid-block, with Benzema and Isco both flanking Ronaldo, who would sit very high in a central position, primed and ready for counter-attacks.
Apart from that slight disparity, the tactical intentions rarely varied from previous years.
Player Roles
Goalkeeper | Goalkeeper:
Aligned with his role and responsibilities of yesteryear, Navas would predominantly focus on distributing shorter and protecting his goal.
Wing-Back | Full-Back:
Both full-backs’ roles and tendencies persisted from yesteryear, with Carvajal naturally the more reserved of the two full-backs. However, both dull-backs would now take up higher initial positions, as Casemiro would drop between the centre-backs to provide defensive cover.
Centre-Back | Centre-Back:
Both centre-backs’ roles and tendencies also remained, with Ramos continuing to be the prime instigator of progression of the two defenders. Varane, instead, prioritised safety both in, and out of, possession.
Ball-Playing Centre-Back | Centre-Back:
Ramos was the side’s primarily ball-player from deep.
Advanced Wing-Back | Full-Back:
As aforementioned, the roles and responsibilities of both full-backs remained from the period of 2015-2017. Therefore, Marcelo was still the more adventurous of the two full-backs in-possession, carrying the ball forward often and linking up with Ronaldo.
Half-Back | Screening Defensive Midfielder:
In this altered system, to allow the full-backs to advance even further, Casemiro was instructed to drop between the side’s two centre-backs to offer extra defensive protection. Akin to 2015-17, Casemiro would still screen the backline more often than not.
Midfield Playmaker | Central Midfielder:
As Casemiro would drop deeper, this would create space in front of the backline for both Kroos and Modrić to situationally drop into - the latter would do this more often, dictating the tempo of the play and aiding the side’s progression.
Like between 2015-17, Modrić, upon receiving the ball, would look to carry past opposition defenders and/or switch the point of attack if the opportunity to do so was there.
Wide Central Midfielder | Central Midfielder:
Kroos’ role hardly differed from yesteryear in spite of the side’s general, structural adaptation, as he would still, situationally, drop deeper and wider to find a vacant pocket to receive the ball in.
From here, his elite passing range never wavered, as he would launch pinpoint switches of play from left-to-right.
Free Role | Winger:
Isco’s role, in this system, was the epitome of a ‘free role’, as he was given complete licence to roam and move wherever he please - often, this would lead to situational overloads being created.
He could, however, make runs in-behind and/or crash the box late as a secondary or tertiary crossing option.
When Real Madrid didn’t have the ball for sustained periods, he would drift over to the right-side to help form Real Madrid’s front three and subsequent first line of pressure.
Centre Forward | Winger:
Benzema was the unsung hero in this Real Madrid machine of 2018.
His exemplary work rate, reading of the game, box-presence, and selflessness created the platform for his team-mates, such as Ronaldo, to thrive upon.
In this system, his role was a lot more complete as he needn’t drop deep as much; rather, he could let his presence be known by occupying a centre-back or dropping into a pocket and linking play.
When Real Madrid didn’t have the ball for sustained periods, Benzema would move to the left-side of the front three, allowing Ronaldo to take up the striker position.
Poacher | Central Outlet Centre Forward:
Ronaldo’s unreal influence on this team never wavered, and this was right on show in 2017/18.
In this system, he was given licence to focus, almost entirely, on scoring and creating goals.
Selfish? Maybe. Effective? Most certainly. GOAT? Potentially…
Results - 433 Version
La Liga:
We were absolutely exceptional in La Liga, winning 33 of our 38 league games, whilst drawing 4 games, and losing just 1 league game all season; In the end, we amassed 103 league points… 17 points clear of runner-up, Barcelona.
Additionally, we scored 104 goals (2.7 goals per game) and conceded just 16 goals (0.42 goals per game) in the league.
Domestic Cups:
We claimed our first piece of silverware for the season, winning the Supercopa de España by defeating Athletic Club 3-0 in the Final - this followed a convincing 1-3 win over city rivals Atletico Madrid in the Semi-Finals.
We made it thrice for the season, beating Atletico Madrid, again, in the Final of the Copa del Rey, 1-4.
UEFA Champions League:
A quadruple.
A famous fourth sealed by beating our fiercest, most competitive of rivals, Barcelona, 1-0 in the Final.
On our way to the Final, we overcame the likes of PSG (7-2 AGG), Chelsea (2-3 AGG), and Benfica (6-4 AGG), after topping the League Phase - winning all 8 games.
Results - 4-4-2 Diamond Version
La Liga:
In the league, with this alternative system, we weren’t quite as comprehensive ourselves, although, the points gap between ourselves and the runner-up had widened further.
Of our 38 league games, we won 32 games, drew 4 games, and lost just twice.
In total, we scored 98 goals (2.57 goals per game) and conceded just 24 goals (0.63 goals per game).
Domestic Cups:
We, again, secured silverware at the earliest available time, winning the Supercopa de España after battering FC Barcelona 4-0 in the Final - this followed an impressive 0-3 derby day victory in the Semi-Finals, vs Atletico Madrid!
Three was the magic number once again, as we defeated Sevilla 0-2 in the Copa del Rey Final to make it another treble!
UEFA Champions League:
Two tactics. Two tests. Two quadruples!
To say Arsenal were fortunate to take us to penalties in the UEFA Champions League Final would be quite the understatement - Real Madrid success on penalties in a UCL Final. Again. Just like in 2016.
On our way to the Final, we overcame the likes of Liverpool (4-2 AGG), Sporting CP (0-2 AGG), and Inter Milan (2-0 AGG), having previously topped the League Phase of the competition.
Read Also
- FM26 Tactics Hub
- FM26 Best Youth Academies
- FM26 Wonderkids by PA, Price & Position
- FM26 Transfer Budgets
Conclusion
Real Madrid are the undisputed Kings of Europe, no doubt.
However, never, even in their wildest and most spectacular of dreams, could they have predicted a threepeat of European success!
It was unprecedented levels of success yet to be matched.
The Real Madrid sides between 2016-2018 will go down as one of the greatest club sides in football history, and rightfully so.
If you want a taste of this beautiful tactic, make sure to download the tactic using the link attached to this article and make sure to follow FM Blog (@fmbIog) and myself (@AshtonGgmu) on our respective socials.
I hope you have enjoyed this article, and I wish you much success with this tactic on your saves! Thanks for reading!
